Introduction
The recent years have witnessed a growing understanding that the effects of innovation policy are dependent on several factors such as the context in which policy instruments and programmes are embedded as well as differing patterns of firm behaviour. While other contributions in this special issue look at innovation policy from the perspective of policy design (Martin this issue), regional innovation systems (Brown this issue), or mission-vs. non-mission-oriented policy approaches (Mazzucato this issue), our paper focuses on the context dependency of the use of R&D policy instruments and its systemic effects. While Flanagan and Uyarra (this issue; see also Flanagan, Uyarra, and Laranja 2011) stress the time and context dependencies of the use of R&D policy instruments, this contribution looks at different behavioural patterns that can be observed independent of the changing general schemes (mission-oriented or programme-dependent) that these instruments are used in.
We analyse the effects of the so-called Direct R&D Project Funding (DPF) scheme, which represents one important strand of instruments that is used by the German Federal Government to promote R&D in private firms. Within direct public funding schemes, public subsidies are offered to all business firms in order to encourage additional efforts in R&D. DPFs are used in mission-oriented programmes (especially the programmes of the German Hightech strategy), or focused on target groups (like the Central Innovation Programme for small-and medium-sized enterprises-SMEs), and also in Federal programmes that accentuate the role of clusters (like the Leading-Edge Cluster Competition).
The question that arises is how these instruments shape the context of private R&D and influence behaviour with respect to private R&D activities. In our analysis, we look at different factors that determine the context of R&D policies: (i) the role of funding aimed at different forms of R&D co-operations (either between business firms and business firms, or between business firms and public research organizations); (ii) the dependence of the policy effect on funding history; and (iii) whether the observed effect depends on the programme context in which a policy instrument is applied. Systemic patterns become obvious when the use of the instruments influences either the behavioural patterns of the actors involved or the division of functions within the innovation system. Of course, different reactions to R&D funding can be observed for individual firms, depending on the individual situation, so that econometric results can identify general trends in a rather diverse field.
The project-related R&D expenditures we are focusing on increased continuously from the 1950s to about €5bn in 2011 (the total government R&D expenditure was €23,446bn. in 2011) .
1 This number can best be compared to the expenditure for basic and applied research (about 55 per cent of the total R&D expenditure of business firms, i.e. €28bn of about €51bn). Thus, public project expenditure within the DPF scheme relates to about 18 per cent of total firm expenditure for research.
DPFs are quite common in Germany when it comes to promoting R&D cooperation. Based on the data-set at hand, we estimate that about 18.2 per cent of all business firms conducting R&D in Germany received DPF funding from the Federal Government for R&D co-operations in 2009, of which about 18.5 per cent cooperate with at least one research institute. SMEs are more likely to participate in R&D programmes for collaborative research: 18.9 per cent of all SMEs conducting R&D were involved in such programmes, of which about only 10.6 per cent cooperate with at least one research institute. From the perspective of individual firms, DPFs are a significant source of public R&D funding.
The data-set from the R&D survey of the SV Wissenschaftsstatistik, which is used in our analysis, represents a full survey of the business firms in Germany that conduct R&D. Thus, we are able to scrutinize how one important aspect of government R&D policy influences firm R&D behaviour.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, an overview of the empirical literature on the effectiveness of R&D programmes is provided. Section 3 discusses the characteristics of our data-set and the methodological approach we use. The results are presented and interpreted in Sections 4 and 5 concludes. 
R&D subsidies and business firm R&D expenditure: literature review

Effect of R&D funding
The economic effects of R&D subsidies on firm R&D expenditure have been the subject of many studies. At the same time, R&D subsidies have been widely used in innovation policy within very different contexts and programmes-partly aimed at the general promotion of R&D, partly also adapted to more mission-oriented approaches.
Economic studies that apply state-of-the-art methodology have mainly focused on the effects of that policy instrument on R&D expenditure (Duguet 2004; Czarnitzki and Fier 2002; Wallsten 2000; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2014) . In their pioneer work, David, Hall, and Toole (2000) surveyed empirical studies to ascertain whether public subsidies crowd out private R&D expenditures. Full crowding out means that total R&D expenditures do not change, and companies reduce private R&D by the amount of public subsidies received. The theoretical background of these papers is derived from a market failure approach: As market incentives lead to a suboptimal level of business firm R&D expenditure, government subsidies induce an increase in private R&D spending in order to internalize the external effects derived from spillovers of R&D.
R&D funding context
This paper looks at the effects of R&D expenditure from a systemic viewpoint. We see R&D subsidies as an instrument which can have a variety of effects depending on the context in which they are applied (either with respect to innovation system context, policy mix or time-dependent factors like policy missions in which they are analysed, see also the contributions of Brown this issue; Flanagan and Uyarra this issue; and Martin this issue).
Empirical evidence shows that the impulse that results from public funding is dependent on different structural conditions like subsidy history, subsidy amount, financial constraints, differentiating between total R&D and private R&D and sources of funding (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014) .
In this paper, we focus on how two factors influence the effects of R&D spending on the extent and composition of R&D with respect to internal and external R&D, namely the role of subsidy history, and the form of collaboration. In addition, we ask whether there are differences between R&D subsidies that are used within a Federal cluster programme compared to those of other programmes. These factors are closely related to the decision mechanisms in R&D departments and to the way the internal knowledge base is developed by collaborative R&D.
R&D subsidy history
Regarding the role of subsidy history, many studies found a persistence of funding over a long time for a significant share of funded firms (see e.g. Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014 for a summary). In addition, firms with subsidy history have a higher propensity to receive funding than firms without a funding history. Of course, the role of subsidy history for R&D behaviour depends largely on how internal routines within the individual firms are designed and the way in which public funds contribute to the overall R&D budget.
It is uncertain, however, whether repeated funding leads to an increase or decrease in R&D activities of individual firms: The costs of firm specific efforts (e.g. writing proposals, winning partners) to receive additional funding may decrease with repeated funding. Partners in collaborative projects profit from the funding experience of firms and thus, previously funded firms are more likely to acquire suitable partners quickly. The released internal funds can basically be allocated to other activities, e.g. additional R&D activities (Zúñiga-Vicente et al. 2014) .
Against these arguments, successful experience might partially increase bandwagon effects. Firms identify R&D subsidies as a continuous financial source and include the subsidies as fixed income for (private) R&D budgets. In this sense, many more R&D projects are offered to the public bodies responsible for R&D programmes and the share of projects which can potentially be funded by internal funds only increases. Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014) argue that government follows a picking-the-winners strategy because funding bodies prefer those projects which are more likely to be successful. These projects, however, do have a better chance of being financed by firms themselves or by other private investors. The overall effect might be ambiguous from a theoretical point of view. Aschhoff (2009) finds that frequently funded firms show greater private R&D spending than firms that have been funded for the first time.
Form of R&D collaboration
The effect of funding instruments on firms' internal and external R&D expenditure is almost completely neglected in empirical research and has received very little attention in recent surveys. Understanding the composition of external and internal R&D and the factors which change this relationship is important for understanding the influence that R&D policy has on the division of labour between business firms and science.
2 While a growing body of literature indicates that private R&D benefits from knowledge spillovers from universities and other publicly funded research institutes within science and business (S&B) collaborative projects (e.g. Adams 2002; Adams, Chiang, and Jeffrey 2003; Autant-Bernard 2001; David, Hall, and Toole 2000; Jaffe 1989; Karlsson and Andersson 2009; Rosa and Mohnen 2008) , we still do not know much about the spillover effects of different forms of R&D collaborations on the level of firms. The empirical study by Czarnitzki, Ebersberger, and Fier (2007) shows significantly higher R&D expenditure per sales by funded firms with collaborations compared to funded firms without collaborations.
It seems reasonable to assume that the effect of R&D policy instruments differs according to the context in which they are used. Programme targets certainly influence the programme-related use and design of single-policy instruments (Flanagan and Uyarra this issue; Flanagan, Uyarra, and Laranja 2011) . At the same time, not much empirical evidence exists on how programme design influences firm behaviour with respect to R&D expenditure.
Methodology and data
Econometric approach
Our objective is to identify the effect of being in a specific group for the group members, for example, for firms that have received funding. This "average mean effect of treatment on the treated" (ATT) is assessed by measuring an outcome variable that captures impacts of R&D grants in the treatment performance. Finding a reliable estimate for the counterfactual state, i.e. the outcome if participants had not participated in the programme, is the principal task of any evaluation study. We employ the so-called "hybrid matching" which combines propensity score matching with Mahalanobis distance for major firm characteristics (see, e.g. Almus and Czarnitzki 2003 for details) to select suitable control firms. After that, we calculate the ATT DID , evaluating the mean change of the R&D indicator over all treated firms between the year before treatment and k years after being treated minus the mean change over all matched non-treated firms for the same indicator and the same period. Compared to a simple comparison of outcomes in the treatment period, the DID estimator has the main advantage that time-invariant effects of selection on unobservable variables (competencies, skills, abilities) are eliminated (see Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd 1998) . While R&D expenditures are directly linked to output variables, like sales of new products (e.g. Janz, Lööf, and Peters 2004) , this measure is a suitable variable that has been discussed in many empirical studies to assess the effects of public subsidies.
Data, sample construction and variables
We prepare a unique data-set based on three data sources: first, we use R&D data collected from the Wissenschaftsstatistik GmbH of Stifterverband (SV Wissenschaftsstatistik) 4 The SV Wissenschaftsstatistik survey of R&D activity in the business enterprise sector is conducted on a two-year cycle in the form of a questionnaire addressed to all identified R&D-active enterprises in Germany ("full survey"). Since there is no complete register from which this information can be obtained, all enterprises which can be presumed to be active in R&D are contacted. The criteria for the selection are essentially R&D reports in previous years, size of the enterprise, industry sector and participation in funding programmes, patent applications, annual reports or press announcements concerning research results. In this sense, it can be considered to be a full survey of the R&D activities of the business enterprise sector. The reporting unit for enterprises is normally the smallest accounting unit enterprise groups, however, are divided up into business units which are classified according to particular economic activities. The data-set collected contains information on R&D expenditures (total, internal, external, financing sources), R&D personnel, strategic orientation of R&D activities as well as some basic facts (turnover, employees, industry). We expand the data-set by including characteristics from the For the purpose of this study, we differentiate between different firm samples (Table 1) . We start with the comparison between firms funded in 2011 and non-funded firms in the same year (sample A). Based on samples B and B1, we ask whether firms with funded business-business collaborations perform better than suitable twins with science-business collaborations. Samples C and C1 highlight the opposite case, i.e. funded firms with sciencebusiness collaborations compared to suitable twins with business-business collaborations. The samples B and B1 as well as C and C1 differ only in the duration of funding. Based on sample D we are able to address the effect of repeated funding on R&D expenditures.
In line with related studies (e.g. Aschhoff 2009; Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento 2014; González and Pazó 2008), we consider main characteristics of firms to explain R&D expenditures, namely (previous) R&D expenditures (log) , R&D expenditures related to firm turnover, previous grant receiving (dummy), firm turnover (log), firm age (log), foreign parent company (dummy), legal form (dummy) and address potential selection effects of programme participation or allocation to a specific treatment group.
Qualitative results
In the assessment of the econometric results below, we use qualitative empirical information that was collected in course of the Accompanying Evaluation of the Leading-Edge Cluster Competition (Rothgang et al. 2014) . We use information from a written survey that asked about differences in DPF projects that were funded in this programme to similar projects funded in other programmes. The questionnaire was sent to funding recipients from the first two competition rounds. In addition, we performed expert interviews with firm representatives. While R&D expenditure was one topic scrutinized, we especially addressed the firm context in which the funded projects were performed and the differences from other programmes. About 30 expert interviews were conducted. These interviews are used here to assess the results of the quantitative analysis. 5 the database is offered by Creditreform, the largest German credit rating agency and Bureau van dijk (Bvd), a leading company in electronic publishing of business information dafne contains current and historical accounting data as well as information on subsidiaries and ownership. 6 the ProFI database covers the civilian r&d funding of the German Federal Government and contains project related information (amount of funding, name and address of recipients, r&d programme, individual versus collaborative projects, etc.). Table 2 shows the probit estimation to derive the propensity score for funded and nonfunded firms (sample A). The propensity to receive funding is greater for firms with a high level of R&D expenditure, firms that have previously been funded and firms that are prospering. Foreign ownership does not matter, although firms that belong to company groups obtain less funding. Since core R&D activities are mostly concentrated close to headquarters, subsidiaries are less active in seeking external funding. Based on propensity score and Mahalanobis distance matching, we match the best suitable non-funded firm to each of the funded firms according to sampling with replacement. For our exemplary constellation, both groups of companies are very similar in terms of key indicators after the matching procedure was applied. The mean values of the variables are very similar for both groups and do not differ significantly from each other (Table 3 ). This result underlines the validity of our matching procedure. Despite the high similarity in core variables, a good "balancing" for the other variables was achieved. 
Effect of R&D funding
The results for all funded firms are depicted in Table 4 . Funded firms exhibit on average an increase of about 28 per cent in R&D expenditures, whereas matched non-funded firms reduce R&D expenditures significantly. The reduction is driven by a substantial drop in internal R&D expenditures. Against this, funded firms increase internal and external R&D expenditures by nearly the same amount. Funded firms also perform better in related R&D intensity measures, although the difference compared to non-funded firms is only significantly different from zero for external R&D expenditures related to turnover. The level of private R&D spending increases significantly. This finding is in line with many other studies for Germany (e.g. Aschhoff 2009 ) and suggests the additionality of R&D subsidies.
The findings for the sub-samples of SMEs are qualitatively similar. In fact, the ATT is slightly larger for SMEs compared to larger firms.
8 Among many others, González and Pazó (2008) also found only small differences in the effect of subsidy on R&D expenditures by firm size. We assume that the higher level of underinvestment in R&D by SMEs (e.g. Bond, Harhoff, and van Reenen 2005; Carpenter and Petersen 2002; Hall 2002 ) might matter. Many SMEs are also confronted with no regular R&D budget at all, which implies higher costs to prepare R&D projects. In contrast to that, the R&D budgets of larger firms are only moderately flexible in the short term, and thus, probably in many cases the increase in R&D expenditure amounted to the sum of the public subsidy.
9 SMEs then are more likely to gain from a subsidy and thus, the leverage effect of public subsidies is larger for SMEs.
These results are in line with the results from expert interviews that were conducted with firms that performed funded R&D cooperation projects in one Federal cluster programme,
7
In fact, the large number of possible twin firms in the r&d survey of sv Wissenschaftsstatistik is a basic prerequisite to prepare the matching procedure successfully.
the Leading-Edge Cluster Competition. The interviews showed that R&D managers tended to use participation in the programme to extend the R&D budget (in some cases also to address new topics that opened up promising new paths of R&D activity). The private co-funding that is usually demanded as pre-requisite for the R&D subsidies is usually provided by shifting internal sources. These interviews also showed that some (but not all) SMEs had no possibility to shift internal sources as their R&D activity level did not provide the opportunity. Thus, their leverage effect with respect to R&D activities tended to be higher. 
Form of collaboration and R&D behaviour
With respect to our first research question, the role of the form of collaboration, we test empirically whether the effect of science and business (S&B) collaborative projects on R&D is significantly different from those of business and business (B&B) collaborative R&D projects. The results of the group comparisons between all funded firms in B&B and matched firms with S&B collaborative R&D projects 10 are presented in Table 5 . The B&B group shows a significantly larger increase of about 29 per cent in R&D expenditure compared to 22 per cent increase for the S&B group. We further detect significant changes towards relatively more external R&D for firms with collaborations with science compared to firms with collaborations with other businesses. The results for SMEs point even more clearly in the same direction. The significantly higher value for S&B firms in terms of R&D expenditure per employee on the one hand, together with the lower increase of internal R&D on the other hand, indicates that funded B&B collaborative R&D projects outperform S&B collaborations with respect to the number of employees within the firm.
11
We further test the robustness of results by considering the time span of funding. Table 6 depicts the findings for at least two years of funding, whereas the time span is not fixed in Table 5 . Based on a more intense increase in internal R&D expenditures, overall rise in R&D expenditures is significantly larger for firms in funded B&B projects than for firms in S&B projects in the mid-term. The composition change towards relatively more external R&D for matched firms with S&B projects is supported again. This finding cannot be confirmed, however, for the sample of SMEs. The change in R&D expenditure does not differ significantly for SMEs with funded R&D collaborations with other businesses compared to SMEs with funded R&D collaborations with science.
10
Matched firms are a subset of all firms with the specific characteristics and thus, we must also analyse the opposite case to test the robustness of findings by considering all firms in the group. 11 the growth rate for firms in B&d projects (15.3 per cent) differs significantly from those for firms in s&B projects (7.9 per cent). The result of composition change is also suggested for the opposite case by looking at all firms with funded S&B projects compared to matched firms with funded B&B projects in the short term (see Table 7 ). The ATTs for the sub-sample of SMEs are insignificant. The same is true for the samples of large firms and SMEs in the mid-term (Table 8) 12
. Therefore, composition change is more likely for larger firms in the short term.
To sum up, there is some evidence that firms with funded R&D collaborations to science prefer to a larger extent the strategic option of the external R&D procurement than firms with funded collaborations to other businesses. The form of collaboration matters for the composition of R&D expenditures even though the level of private R&D spending does not differ significantly.
While the interviews with programme participants do not clearly indicate the direct reasons for differences in changing internal vs. external R&D expenditure, they show that in many cases firms engage in S&B and B&B research co-operations for different reasons, which should also influence their effects on the R&D budget:
• The expert interviews showed, that in a division of labour with firms, public research units often focus their collaborative projects on application-oriented basic research, which is inspired by applied questions or projects that are pre-competitive from the viewpoint of the individual firm. In this manner, firms are able to gain new impulses from collaborative research with research institutes with the aim of enhancing their knowledge base from impulses that result from basic research. At the same time, internal R&D is often necessary to make use of externally created knowledge.
• On the contrary, collaboration between business firms is often oriented towards making use of different knowledge bases in the development of new products and production processes. The collaboration is often more oriented towards realizing a common benefit from the project.
From this behavioural perspective, it seems probable that S&B collaborations lead to an increase both in internal and external R&D expenditure, while B&B collaborations are more associated with a relative increase in internal R&D. Table 9 sheds light on the role of subsidy history, the second major object of investigation in our study. Frequently funded firms showed a higher increase in R&D indicators for total R&D spending, private R&D spending as well as internal R&D expenditures than firms funded for the first time. The pattern confirms Aschhoff 's findings (2009) . In addition to that, we conclude that repeated funding helps the firms to build up and stabilize their research capabilities. With respect to the discussion in section 2, one may assume that effects on innovation performance might be different. Aschhoff (2009) found no significant differences between first-time funded and frequently funded firms. As her analysis did not address the composition ratio of internal to external R&D, we do not know whether the finding is due to the fact that composition change was observed. Observations from our expert interviews show that there are no simple patterns to explain why some firms regularly participate in public programmes, while others do not. Many firms that do irregularly participate in public programmes also do not conduct their own R&D on a regular basis. R&D projects (whether internally or externally financed) in these firms are conducted on a less regular basis which leads to irregular patterns of R&D expenditure. Projects are undertaken when an opportunity arises and a new project idea comes up. Firms that take part in R&D programmes on a regular basis, on the other hand, seem to have a smoother growth in their R&D expenditure. Our interviews showed that public funding developed into a fixed part of their R&D activities with a close interdependence of externally financed (often more precompetitive) projects and internal projects that are closer to the core R&D tasks at the firm level. This should also lead to a smoother pattern of R&D over time. 
Subsidy History and R&D Behaviour
Programme characteristics and R&D behaviour
While the above analysis does not differentiate between the programmes within which the funding scheme is used, another analysis based on the same data-set and method compared the effect within one new complex funding programme (the Leading-Edge Cluster Competition) with participation in other programmes (see Eckl et al., 2016) . Based on these results, the first signs of the effect of the mainly time-invariant funding instrument and its use in different programme schemes can be recognized. The aim of the Leading-Edge Cluster Competition is to give an additional impulse by funding projects that are developed under one common cluster strategy by regional firms and research institutes. The results of the econometric analysis show that there were no significant differences with respect to the leverage effect on R&D expenditure as compared to firms funded in other programmes. The common characteristic is that the procedures involved in application and supervision and the respective requirements from the project-executing organizations are rather similar. Thus, from the perspective of the individual firms, the projects are regarded as substitutes (Eckl et al., 2016) . This was also confirmed by expert interviews with firms and a written survey conducted in the course of the evaluation of the Leading-Edge Cluster Competition (Rothgang et al. 2014) . Involved firms saw little difference between the one or the other kind of funding programme and actually most firm representatives stated that their project could be financed in different kinds of programmes with little practical differences. Differences arose, for example, with respect to contacts with new co-operation partners in programmes that were designed to reach that goal or with respect to programmes that were more or less application-oriented. Whether these differences show up in other indicators (or long-term changes in R&D expenditure) has not yet been examined.
Conclusions
By looking at the effect of project R&D subsidies on the behaviour of firms in Germany, our study extends the knowledge of the influence of the research system on business sector R&D activities. We combine propensity score matching with a difference-in-difference estimator in order to address the effect of R&D subsidies on firm R&D expenditure, the role of funding history, as well as the form of funded collaboration on R&D expenditures and its composition. By analysing policy effects based on a focused set of instruments and objectives, this contribution sheds light on path and context dependencies of innovation policy measures.
Our results point in a similar direction as other contributions in this special issue (especially Flanagan and Uyarra this issue; and Brown this issue) as they show how important it is to understand the individual factors that contribute to the (degree of) success of innovation policy: we find that both funding history and form of collaboration influence the effect of R&D subsidies on firm behaviour. Thus, both the long-term development of R&D policy and the R&D programme structure are relevant for the outcome:
• Frequently funded firms show a larger increase in private R&D spending than firms funded for the first time.
• Firms with B&B collaborations increase their R&D budget by a significantly larger amount, which leads to a higher leverage effect (however not automatically a better outcome of R&D).
• Firms in funded R&D collaborations with science increase external R&D procurement by a larger amount than firms in funded collaborations with other businesses even though the level of private R&D spending is unchanged. The results on internal and external R&D expenditures should be regarded in the more general context of firms' outsourcing of R&D activities: Firms in funded business-to-business collaborations tend to have a lower composition change towards external R&D than matched firms in science-to-business collaborations. Thus, from a systemic point of view, funding science-to-business collaborations seems to promote the externalization of R&D tasks. The effect is less pronounced for longer term collaborations, however.
• We find no difference in the effects mentioned for the subsample of SMEs. So, it seems that the system does not affect SME behaviour differently when compared to large firms although many studies come to the conclusion that SMEs have more problems with R&D funding.
• By comparing the effect of R&D project funding in one programme, the Leading-Edge Cluster Competition, with other programmes, we find evidence that two instruments that seem rather different from the perspective of researchers and policy-makers can be practically substitutes from the perspective of the individual firms. Our comparison shows no difference in the effect of the instruments on private R&D expenditure. This finding adds empirical evidence to the problems that have to be regarded in implementing innovation policies which are discussed by Flanagan and Uyarra (this issue). However, it is of course possible that in line with the targets of the programme either long-term effects on R&D expenditure or effects with respect to other indicators of innovation activities or output may be found.
With respect to the systemic effects of R&D project funding our results also indicate that private R&D spending is not hampered if funding bodies select previously funded firms and that funded collaborations are characterized by heterogeneous actors. The structure of the R&D project landscape (kinds of projects) and the firm landscape (experienced firms that have been funded before vs. firms which have not previously received R&D project funding) influence the outcome with respect to firm R&D expenditure.
Of course, the relationship between R&D project funding and R&D activities/output is only one aspect of project funding. How the public R&D project funding landscape influences the R&D output should be looked at in future studies.
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